using new data bases, our comparative analyses of the effects of different institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that institutional differences lead to unexpected outcomes and generate the paradox of redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we others, the paradox of redistribution (Fischer and Schotter, 1978, Schotter, 1981), the paradox of new members (Brams, 1975, Brams and Af fuso, 1976) and the paradox of large size (Brams, 1975). Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction. We investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short 2020-08-17 · Second, in line with the dynamic political arguments suggested in the Paradox, I explore the evolution of social transfers and redistribution within countries over time. Overall, countries have increased redistribution by making their transfers less pro-poor, which matches the predictions of the Paradox (see Figure 2).

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The trade-off is similar to the paradox of redistribution of targeting vs. redistribution in rich welfare states. Case-study evidence illustrates how countries have managed this tradeoff. The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem.

As a consequence, the redistributive impact of such systems tends to be smaller. 2013-06-08 · The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one. For what it matters, targeting tends to be associated with higher levels of redistribution, especially when overall effort in terms of spending is high.

The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox. with redistribution. My paper provides a di erent view on the impact of welfare state design. The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about political developments at country level. Therefore, contrasting it requires exploring the link between policy design and redistribution within countries over time. The constitutions of contemporary democracies uphold equal voting rights for citizens. Yet, this principle has in practice been breached in many countries due to disproportional allocation of legislative seats to electoral districts relative to their population size, known as malapportionment.

Yet, substantively the trade-off has strong resonance with the political economy of mature welfare states. It is related to Lindert’s (2004) Robin Hood paradox—redistribution happens least where it is most necessary. Lindert Abstract. This article examines the relationship between legislative malapportionment, redistribution, and regional economic development. One of the primary justifications for legislative malapportionment—the disparity between the share of legislative seats and the share of the national population—is interregional income equalization by means of favorable allocations of resources to rural The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one.
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In this paper, the paradox of redistribution is translated to system dynamics and the coherence of the theory is analyzed by a system dynamics model. The system dynamics translation results in a model that reproduces the reference modes. the Paradox of Redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce Cumulatively, a large volume of spending and limited private provision is the mechanism that explains the “paradox of redistribution”: the less the countries resort to targeting through means testing, the more they reduce poverty and inequality. social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox.

Joakim Palme and Walter Korpi () No 174, LIS Working papers from LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg Effective redistribution, they argued, resulted less from a Robin Hood logic – taking from the rich to give to the poor – than from a broad and egalitarian provision of services and transfers. Hence, the paradox: a country obtained more redistribution when it took from all to give to all than when it sought to take from the rich to help the poor. the paradox of redistribution.
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The paper ends with a discussion and conclusion. . Background Section 2.1 presents the system dynamics method, 2.2 presents the paradox of redistribution and section 2.3 presents system dynamics translations. social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox.

The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about distributive politics. Therefore, contrasting it requires exploring the link between policy design and redistribution within countries over time. With this aim, I conduct a panel analysis of the redistributive impact of social transfers The Paradox of Redistribution Andrew Jackson / June 13, 2015 The issue of how to deal with rising inequality and the squeezed middle-class has recently moved to the centre of political debate, with the various parties proposing significant policy changes. Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil | Publius: The Journal of Federalism | Oxford Academic.

Rethinking the paradox of redistribution 2 should do about the less well-adjusted minority, and benefits are susceptible to retrenchment on the grounds of ‘fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998: 158). For no policy area are these logics likely to apply so strongly as for the policy area of The paradox and its critics Korpi and Palme’s article on the paradox of redistribution remains one of the most widely cited articles in comparative welfare state research. They present and support a politically important and rather counterintuitive argument: the more social benefits are targeted to the poor, much is actually available for redistribution. The reasoning is that, paradoxically, in countries with selective welfare systems less resources tend to be available for redistribution because there is less widespread and less robust political support for redistribution. As a consequence, the redistributive impact of such systems tends to be smaller. This article examines the relationship between legislative malapportionment, redistribution, and regional economic development. One of the primary justifications for legislative malapportionment—the disparity between the share of legislative seats and the share of the national population—is interregional income equalization by means of favorable allocations of resources to rural areas 2013-06-08 · The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one.